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This article aims to contribute to the understanding of contemporary 
anti-Muslim hostility, focusing on a specific national embodiment of 
it, namely Islamophobia in Britain. Globalization notwithstanding, 
anti-Muslim discourse does vary across different national contexts 
(witness, for example, the relatively strong opposition to 
manifestations of religion in the public sphere in France). However, 
these variations have not so far been the subject of any extensive 
empirical or comparative study. Discourse cannot be properly 
analyzed or understood in isolation from the context in which it 
arises, and the extent to which anti-Muslim rhetoric is linked to the 
concerns and anxieties of those who propagate it should not be 
overlooked. Questioning the claim that is sometimes made, by 
various interested parties, that contemporary Islamophobia is merely 
the most recent manifestation of an age-old hostility to Islam on the 
part of Christendom/the West which has existed since the very 
beginning, this article illustrates some of the ways in which the 
discursive content of selected themes has changed and evolved 
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according to the nature of the societies in which the discourse 
circulates. The current article aims to make a modest and qualitative 
contribution to the thematic analysis of anti-Muslimism and 
Islamophobic discourse. 
While the term “Orientalist” has been primarily applied to 
academic production, as well as to art and literature, the term 
“Islamophobia” generally applies more to popular culture, including 
the media and grassroots prejudice. For various reasons, including 
the declining importance of the nation-state and the rise of 
postmodernism, academics are now far less likely to represent 
particular national interests than they were in the colonial period, or 
even in the 1970s when Said wrote his seminal book;1 and the 
atmosphere in the academy is now one of greater uncertainty and an 
unwillingness to subscribe to metanarratives.2 Therefore, continuities 
with classical anti-Muslim themes are more likely to be found in 
popular culture, which is the focus of this article.  
It must be acknowledged that even with the best of intentions, 
it is not always easy to distinguish between “legitimate criticism” of 
Islam and “unfounded hostility”;3 but as Halliday argues, it is 
important to make the effort to do so.4 This is perhaps an even more 
crucial distinction in an age in which some Muslims themselves 
contribute to essentialist, Orientalist-style discourse which may be felt 
to enhance the status of Muslims or Islam as a “threat” to the West. 
Academically, and even Islamically (i.e. arguing from Islamic sources), 
it is not difficult to deconstruct the link between Islam and abusive 
practices such as forced marriages, honour killings, and female 
circumcision, though the link may persist in media coverage and 
popular discourse. However, the case is more nuanced when it 
comes, for example, to punishments sanctioned in the classical 
Shari’a and seen as harsh in today’s world.5 Even accepting that these 
                                                 
1 See Said.  
2 Turner, 27-29.  
3 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, 4. 
4 Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, 164.  
5 Some of the hadd punishments (i.e. those prescribed in the Qur’an and/or 
Sunnah) have been consistently condemned as cruel and inhumane by Amnesty 
International. See, e.g., 
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punishments are seen as valid by some Muslims, and that in a small 
number of Muslim countries they are sometimes carried out, a 
problem arises when the reporting of such things leads to the 
creation of an essentializing discourse in which the link between 
Islam and violence, for example, is naturalized through constant 
reiteration and reinforcement.  
Three main themes—namely gender, violence and 
foreignness—have been selected for analysis because they were the 
main ones that emerged from my field research; in the course of this 
research, I found that even the non-verbal hostility my interviewees 
encountered seemed to fall under one of these three headings. The 
focus on specific themes (together with their accompanying topoi and 
motifs) will make it possible to observe the various ways in which 
they are constructed, their relative and shifting importance, and the 
interrelationship between them. The extent to which the treatment of 
these themes echoes or departs from traditional Orientalist 
approaches will be of interest, as will ways in which they reflect 
contemporary British and/or European concerns and anxieties, for 
example about national identity.  
The primary research for this article is mainly based on 
interviews with British Muslim converts, but also includes some 
reference to the media, which will provide useful contextualization. 
Since converts are usually targeted as Muslims, this will shed light on 
contemporary British Islamophobia in general. Furthermore, the 
experiences of white converts (who made up approximately two-
thirds of my sample) arguably provide an opportunity to observe 
anti-Muslim hostility in its purest form, excluding (in theory at least) 
the ethnic/racial dimension. To put it another way, on occasions 
when they are recognized and targeted as converts, it may be possible 
to extricate religious hostility from racial (although, as will be seen, 
the dividing line between the two may be blurred, even in the case of 
white converts). The inclusion of the “grassroots” element of 
Muslims’ actual experience in this article should be a useful 
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complement to previous research in the British context which has 
often focused on newspaper coverage.6  
After locating the three chosen themes in the historical context 
of Christian anti-Muslim polemic and Orientalist discourse, this 
article situates British anti-Muslim hostility in its sociopolitical 
context, and briefly problematizes “Islamophobia,” both as a term 
and a concept. This problematization is necessitated by the broad, 
sometimes indiscriminate, and often controversial, application of the 
term. The main section then draws on the findings of my own 
fieldwork, in which interviewees were asked about their experiences 
of hostility or discrimination.7 In conclusion, I will reflect upon the 
significance of my findings, and suggest possible future lines of 
enquiry which may help in arriving at a deeper understanding of 
Western responses and reactions to Islam. 
 
1. Gender, Violence, and Foreignness  
as Perennial Themes in Anti-Muslim Discourse 
 
Orientalist discourse up until the Enlightenment was predominantly 
Christian-led, and the language and discursive field were primarily 
religious and theological, with Muhammad, the Qur’an, and Islamic 
theology being the main areas of discussion. Primary concerns were 
the alleged falseness of the revelations, Muhammad’s deliberate 
manipulation of these, and his failure to perform miracles on a par 
with those of Jesus. Daniel’s magisterial study of late medieval 
Christian anti-Islamic polemic demonstrates the perennial nature of 
the preoccupation with violence and sensuality. In a medieval society 
in which Christianity formed the central element of individual, social 
and communal identity, distortions of Islam reached the point where 
                                                 
6See in particular: Poole, Reporting Islam and Richardson.   
7While the general findings of that research were written up in my book British 
Muslim Converts: Choosing Alternative Lives, the issue of discrimination was only briefly 
touched on therein. I am indebted to the British Academy and to the School of 
Oriental and African Studies for providing, respectively, financial support and 
research leave which helped to make the empirical research on Muslim converts 
which is referred to in this article possible. 
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“nonsense was accepted…because whatever seemed useful to faith 
was thought likely to be true.”8  
The rise of secular humanism in the Enlightenment period and 
beyond gave rise to a reassessment of Islam, sometimes resulting in 
more positive views, for example secular-oriented admiration of 
Muhammad as a robust and effective leader, in contrast to Jesus’ lack 
of worldly success. However, it also led to a view of religion in 
general as irrational - a view which still often finds favor in the 
secular-dominated media. Rodinson provides a vivid description of 
images in art and literature which appealed to the European 
imagination in the Romantic period, in which the themes of 
exoticism (i.e. foreignness), sensuality (usually gender-related) and 
violence are intertwined:  
 
Fierce and lavish scenes in a wild array of colors; harems and 
seraglios; decapitated bodies; women hurled into the Bosphorus 
in sacks; feluccas and brigantines displaying the Crescent flag; 
round turquoise domes and white minarets soaring to the 
heavens; viziers, eunuchs, and odalisques; refreshing springs under 
palm trees; giaours with their throats slit; captive women forced 
into submission by their lustful captors.9  
 
The image of Islam that emerged in the Romantic era was not 
infrequently an attractive one; for example, Thomas Carlyle’s famous 
1840 lecture on “The Hero as Prophet” rejected the widespread ideas 
that Islam was spread by the sword and that Muhammad was an 
“impostor,” and idealized the Arabs (including Muhammad) as “a 
swift-handed, deep-hearted race of men…a gifted noble people; a 
people of wild strong feelings,” etc.10  
The colonial period gave rise to more geographically- and 
politically-oriented forms of Orientalism; anti-Muslim discourse now 
embraced a new function which has been amply documented in 
Said’s Orientalism: the justification of the imperial project, with a 
corresponding need to show the irrationality, barbarity, obscurantism 
                                                 
8 Daniel, 302.  
9 Rodinson, 59. 
10 Carlyle, 54.  
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and backwardness of Muslims and Islam (and therefore their need to 
be “civilized” and “enlightened”). Ernest Renan’s famous lecture on 
“Islam and Science” (delivered at the Sorbonne in 1883), depicting 
Islam as antithetical to reason, progress, creativity and reform, was an 
early example of such attitudes.11 In the postcolonial period, 
postmodernism has had conflicting and contradictory results, its 
championing of the “underdog” having a leveling effect with regard 
to genders, sexualities and races and (in theory at least) giving a voice 
to oppressed and disadvantaged minorities. In light of global 
inequalities, Muslims may be seen as such minorities, both 
internationally and in Western nation-states. The dominance of 
human rights discourse offers hope to dispossessed Muslims but can 
also give rise to the construction of Islam as politically repressive and 
intolerant (continuing the colonialist theme of the Oriental despotic 
ruler). The elevation of pluralism similarly offers certain advantages 
to minorities, but it does little to detract from a secular ethos which 
has scant sympathy for religious worldviews, continuing to see 
religions as outmoded and patriarchal, among other things.  
Issues of gender and sexuality have a high profile in both 
Muslim and non-Muslim discourse on Islam. The subject of women 
in Islam is highly sensitized due to the long history of polemic and 
apologetic between Muslims and non-Muslims on this issue, and is 
not without political implications. In the colonial period, claims that 
Islam’s teachings on women were evidence of its “backwardness” 
provided justification for political intervention in Muslim countries, 
and the construction of Islam as “oppressive” towards women 
continues to serve specific Western political interests;12 an example 
would be the invocation of women’s rights issues in connection with 
American military intervention in Afghanistan in recent years.13 The 
gender-related discourse changed markedly over time. In the early 
centuries of Muslim-Christian encounter, Islam was attacked for its 
alleged moral laxity and sensuality, with accusations focusing on 
Muhammad’s alleged “lustfulness” (with reference to his multiple 
                                                 
11 Hourani, 120-121. 
12 See, e.g. Bullock, 227. 
13 Abu-Lughod, 783-790. 
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marriages and in particular his marriage to Zaynab), the Qur’an’s 
sensual depiction of Paradise, and the licitness of concubinage and 
divorce as well as polygyny. In the Romantic period, by contrast, the 
harem and the seraglio became objects of nostalgia and fascination. The 
increasingly restrictive sexual mores of middle- and upper-class 
Victorian England gave rise to a sensual and sexualized view of the 
Orient, with Oriental women being seen as objects whose purpose 
was to offer sexual gratification. As Kabbani says of the erotic 
paintings of this period: “Such portraits, in wishing to convey the 
East, described more accurately, Europe. They portrayed the 
repressiveness of its social codes, and the heavy hand of its bourgeois 
morality.”14 More recently, with the rise of feminist ideas in Western 
societies, the “oppression” of Muslim women has become a favoured 
theme, even more so in the postcolonial than in the colonial era. 
The theme of violence has been no less persistent than gender-
related themes in anti-Muslim discourse, though the reasons for its 
prominence have changed. For early Christians, the idea that Islam 
was “spread by the sword” (and the accompanying idea of 
Muhammad and Muslims as “bloodthirsty”) was significant because it 
contrasted so markedly with the Christian ideal model of Jesus, who 
did not engage in military activity. At certain points of the history of 
Muslim-Christian relations, various parts of Europe were in fact 
under threat from Muslim military expansion, the main crisis points 
being Muslim incursions into Southern Europe in the eighth century, 
the capture of Constantinople in the fifteenth and the siege of Vienna 
in the sixteenth. However, once subjugated by Western colonialist 
expansion Muslims were seen as rather less threatening and other 
themes, such as those of irrationality and backwardness, took 
precedence over that of violence, though the latter did not 
completely disappear. In recent decades, the alleged violence of Islam 
is related to the rise of political Islam and, latterly, Jihadist activism 
and so-called “Islamic terrorism.”  
Foreignness, in a sense, stands for Otherness in general – the 
perception of an alien culture, values, way of life etc. Inevitably, it is 
constructed differently in a world of nation-states than it was in 
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former times. In the early centuries of Muslim-Christian/European 
encounter, foreignness/Otherness was usually constructed in 
religious terms, with Islam being viewed as heretical or as a harbinger 
of the apocalypse, for example.15 If nineteenth-century Romanticism, 
inspired by the tales of travelers such as Richard Burton and Charles 
Doughty, constructed an exotic and alluring vision of the Orient 
(which has not wholly died out), twenty-first-century nations in the 
West are more concerned with issues of national identity, 
immigration and social cohesion. In recent decades – at least in the 
British context – racial and ethnic markers have decreased in 
importance as color racism has ceased to be acceptable; but a cultural 
racism which emphasizes the “foreign values” of Muslims has, if 
anything, increased. 
 
2. Islamophobia in the British Context 
 
Unlike other parts of the world, Europe has a long history of conflict 
with Islamic polities, and this has clearly influenced the development 
and evolution of its views of Islam. While not denying the impact of 
distant events on shaping the discourse, I would suggest as a general 
rule that the more recent the event, the greater its impact on 
contemporary views. To risk stating the obvious, imperialism is rather 
more important in the scheme of things than the Crusades. Halliday 
points out that British imperial history differs from that of France, 
both in terms of its general impact on national identity (imperialism 
being more formative in the case of France), and in terms of the role 
played by Muslims (again, being rather more significant in the case of 
France). Britain’s most difficult encounters were with non-Muslim 
groups such as Hindu mutineers and Irish Catholic republicans rather 
than with Muslims.16 Similarly, Winter argues that British national 
identity differs from many of its European counterparts in that it 
lacks a history of self-construction against an Islamic rival, and that 
British xenophobia has been directed more against others than 
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against Muslims.17 Events of the past few decades such as the 1973 
OPEC oil price rises, the Iranian hostage crisis, the ongoing Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and more recently 9/11, while important globally 
and having some influence on British views, have been relatively 
more significant for American perceptions of Islam.18 The July 2005 
London bombings notwithstanding, the above considerations, taken 
together with Britain’s recent history of multiculturalism, may mean 
that a less contentious view of Islam prevails in Britain, as compared 
to France and the US.  
One incident which has had particular resonance in Britain 
occurred at the end of the 1980s; the Rushdie Affair gave a new 
impetus to anti-Muslim hostility in Britain. The events surrounding 
this affair marked a shift from race and ethnicity to religion as the 
core element not just in British Muslim identity, but also in anti-
Muslim hostility, which was now increasingly expressed in religious 
rather than racial terms. Widely circulated (and sometimes staged) 
images of bearded, robed, foreign-looking Muslims demonstrating 
and burning books contributed to a view of Islam and Muslims as 
anti-modern, repressive, intolerant, and obscurantist; and the 
protestors appeared to be challenging one of the most cherished 
values of contemporary Western societies: freedom of speech. 
Equally importantly, by bringing religion into the public sphere they 
were going against the model of European modernity, whose 
trajectory over the course of the past two or three centuries had been 
in the opposite direction. More recently, the Danish cartoons affair 
has given fresh impetus to the above stereotype, with violent 
overtones being conveyed by the widely disseminated images of 
placards bearing threatening and bloodthirsty messages, ostensibly in 
defense of Islam and its prophet. 
The term “Islamophobia” is increasingly used to refer to 
religiously-motivated hostility directed at Muslims. It was popularized 
in Britain by the publication in 1997 of the Runnymede Trust’s report 
entitled Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All, and it became more 
widely accepted in Europe as a whole after the publication of the 
                                                 
17 Winter, 7-12. 
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EUMC (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia) 
Islamophobia reports of 2001 and 2005.19 In general, it has become 
more prominent in public discourse since 9/11. The Runnymede 
Trust report concluded that Islamophobia was a pervasive feature of 
British society and that media reporting on Muslims and Islam was 
biased and unfair.20 In 2002, the EUMC reported that there was a real 
possibility of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism becoming acceptable 
in European society.21 The far right, both in Europe generally and in 
Britain, have in the last few years begun focusing on religion rather 
than just race, often singling out Islam.22 
Muslims have been particular targets for hostility in recent years 
for a number of reasons. In the wake of 9/11 and the July bombings, 
more questions have been raised about their commitment to core 
European values such as democracy and gender equality, and there 
has been a new emphasis on social cohesion, with the blame for lack 
of integration sometimes being placed on Muslims rather than on 
racism and discrimination.23 Exacerbating factors have included 
recent UK foreign policy, and the fact that a high proportion of 
asylum-seekers and refugees are Muslims.  
Modood sees anti-Muslim prejudice as a form of cultural 
racism, and uses the term “Islamophobia” interchangeably with other 
terms such as “anti-Muslimism” and “Muslimophobia.” He describes 
cultural racism as a “two-step racism . . .  with colour racism being 
the first step.” In other words, culturalism combines with color 
racism in a sort of “double whammy” which can be particularly 
potent (as with the combination of nationalism and racism);24 this is 
                                                 
19See Cesari.  
20The follow-up report in 2004, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action, found that 
while there had been some improvements, levels of anti-Muslim prejudice had 
increased in certain quarters. 
21Anwar, 31.  
22Chris Allen, 54. There have also been some positive developments in the wake of 
9/11, such as a new openness in some sections of the media (and generally 
responsible reporting in the immediate aftermath of 9/11), new opportunities for 
dialogue between Muslims and government, and new Muslim initiatives to combat 
extremism. See Hussain, 125-126. 
23Tariq Modood, “Foreword.,” viii. 
24Tariq Modood, Multicultural Politics, 8.  
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to be understood in light of the fact that two-thirds of British 
Muslims are of South Asian descent. Modood maintains that 
“Muslimophobia is at the heart of contemporary British and 
European cultural racism.”25 His description of the way in which 
cultural racism operates more than hints at why Muslims should 
suffer from it to a greater degree than most: 
 
Racialized groups that have distinctive cultural identities or a 
community life defined as “alien,” will suffer an additional 
dimension of discrimination and prejudice. The hostility against 
the non-white minority is likely to be particularly sharp if the 
minority in question is sufficiently numerous to reproduce itself as 
a community and has a distinctive and cohesive value system that can be 
perceived as an alternative, and a possible challenge, to the norm…Cultural 
racism is likely to be particularly aggressive against those minority 
communities that want to maintain, and not just defensively, some 
of the basic elements of their culture or religion and if, far from 
denying their difference (beyond the color of their skin) they want 
to assert this difference in public and demand to be accepted just as 
they are. [My emphasis.]26 
 
As mentioned above, in view of the controversy surrounding 
“Islamophobia,” any in-depth discussion of it needs to problematize 
it as a term and, equally importantly, as a concept. Even the 
Runnymede Trust report which led to its popularization and 
acceptance in the British context concedes that the term is “not 
ideal,” but justifies its use on pragmatic grounds: “because there is a 
new reality which needs naming: anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so 
considerably and so rapidly that a new item in the vocabulary is 
needed so that it can be identified and acted against.”27 The term 
“Islamophobia” is problematic not least because it applies to a very 
diverse set of phenomena, including many different forms of 
discourse (e.g. journalistic, literary, vernacular) and different types of 
action. The Runnymede Trust report lists different ways and contexts 
in which Islamophobia may operate: exclusion (e.g. from government 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 37. 
26 Ibid., 38-39. 
27 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, 4. 
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or employment), violence (including verbal abuse), prejudice (e.g. in 
the media or everyday conversation) and discrimination (e.g. in 
employment practices or the provision of services).28 It could be 
argued that its usage has become too broad and generalized to have 
much explanatory value. The fact that, like the term 
“fundamentalist,” it is often used uncritically and seldom 
problematized, only adds to the difficulties. 
Controversy over the term “Islamophobia” turns on at least 
three different axes. Firstly, and most straightforwardly, there is 
discussion of the relative merits of this term as opposed to 
alternatives such as “anti-Muslimism” (with some fearing that 
widespread use of the term “Islamophobia” may lead to restrictions 
on criticism of Islam or on academic freedom in the study of Islam). 
Secondly, there is disagreement over the extent to which it is valid or 
helpful to treat Islam and Muslims as a special case, as opposed to 
subsuming them under a more general category such as “cultural 
racism.” Thirdly, and related to the second axis, there is a debate over 
the extent to which it is helpful to promote “Islamophobia” as a 
centrally organizing concept which informs and shapes the 
opposition to hostility and discrimination against Muslims. Some 
point to the danger of promoting a “victim mentality” or to the 
inevitable backlash when one group is seen as receiving special 
treatment. The second axis is the most relevant to the present 
discussion, since the view of Islam as a special or unique case often 
goes hand-in-hand with the belief that anti-Islamic prejudice is a 
perennial, entrenched phenomenon and that Orientalist modes of 
discourse are relatively constant over time. This stance is all the more 
powerful because it reflects vested interests: a Huntingtonian view of 
divisions along cultural fault-lines can be used to justify certain 
foreign and domestic policies, but it is also convenient for Muslim 
leaders who wish to enhance their own position by invoking threats 
and stirring up hostility.  
Those who see anti-Muslim feelings as being engrained in the 
Western psyche tend to underestimate the importance of contingent 
factors while overemphasizing the importance of Islam as an 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 12. 
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explanatory factor. They also tend to downplay or ignore the fact that 
both historically and in the present, other foes such as Jews, gypsies 
or rival Christian sects, have been equally demonized at different 
times.29 In relation to the portrayal of “folk devils” in the media, 
Muslims can be seen as just one in a long line which has included, 
among other things, punks, welfare scroungers, teenage mothers, 
gypsies and travelers, and different groups of immigrants.30 Halliday 
cautions against exaggerating the continuity between the medieval 
and the contemporary polemic, arguing that focusing on contingent 
causes is more conducive to change than attributing hostility to 
entrenched historical positions.31 It is clear from the thematic 
overview above that although anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiment 
may have existed to varying degrees through the ages, its discursive 
content has changed dramatically according to the historical context. 
The media is arguably one of the most powerful driving forces 
of anti-Muslimism in Britain. For most non-Muslim Britons, the 
media is the primary source of information about Islam and Muslims; 
and Poole’s research shows a close correspondence between 
representations of Islam in the press and public opinion.32 The 2007 
report commissioned by the then Mayor of London, Ken 
Livingstone, The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and 
the UK Media, found a prevailing view that “there is no common 
ground between the West and Islam, and that conflict between them 
is accordingly inevitable.”33 The overall picture in the media is that 
globally, Islam is “profoundly different from, and a serious threat to, 
the West, and that within Britain Muslims are different from and a 
threat to ‘Us.’”34 Muslims are depicted as “challenging ‘our’ culture, 
values, institutions and way of life.”35 The report, which examined 
press material from the year 2006, identifies several components of 
the dominant narrative. These include the failure of Muslims to 
                                                 
29 See Joseph. 
30 The Search for Common Ground: Muslims, Non-Muslims and the UK Media, 119. 
31 Halliday, “‘Islamophobia’ Reconsidered,” 895. 
32 Poole, Reporting Islam, 240 and 250. 
33 The Search for Common Ground, xiii.  
34 Ibid., 18. 
35 Ibid., 30. 
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integrate, their unreasonable demands, their mixed loyalties and 
support for extremism, their obscurantism, and the incompatibility of 
their values and interests with those of mainstream society.36 Other 
studies, notably those by Poole and Richardson,37 which focus on 
material from the mid- to late-1990s, confirm the overriding 
impression of the Otherization of Muslims in the British press, with 
non-Muslims and Muslims being constructed as “Us” and “Them” 
respectively. Both studies found that there were strong consensual 
interpretive frameworks operating in the representation of Muslims, 
with coverage mostly confined to a limited range of themes, and 
stories selected on the basis of how well they fit in with those themes.  
It may well seem that, as Miles and Brown suggest, “there is 
something unique about Islamophobia,”38 in light of the fact that 
currently, Muslims seem to be relatively more demonized than most, 
if not all, other groups in the Western media.39 They are criticised by 
elements across the whole political spectrum, being liable to fall foul 
of the xenophobia or anti-immigration stance of the right wing as 
well as the liberalism/human-rights stance of the left. Ironically, 
Muslims received some positive coverage in the conservative press in 
1999-2000 for their opposition, together with other faith groups, to 
government plans to withdraw Clause 28 which prevented the 
promotion of homosexuality in schools.40 
 
3. Case Study: the Experience of British Muslim 
Converts 
 
This section is based mainly on field research conducted in 2005-6, 
but it also draws on research on the media and refers to selected 
articles from the British press. It begins by providing an overview of 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 103. 
37 For details, see fn. 5 above. Poole has also published a follow-up article dealing 
with more recent developments: “The Effects of September 11 and the War in Iraq 
on British Newspaper Coverage,’ in Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, eds., 
Muslims and the News Media, 89-102.  
38 Miles and Brown, 164. 
39 Poole, Reporting Islam, 252. 
40 Poole, “The Effects of September 11,” 100. 
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the type and extent of hostility encountered by the interviewees, 
before focusing on the three chosen themes. This overview will serve 
to highlight the gender imbalance in terms of degree and frequency 
of hostility encountered, and to show that ideas and concepts related 
to the three themes may be “in the air” even when not expressed 
verbally.  
On beginning my research I anticipated that the nature of the 
hostility encountered by converts would be broadly similar to that 
encountered by born Muslims, with the possible added dimension of 
“betrayal” – whether cultural, political or racial - when they are 
targeted as converts to Islam. While discourse related to foreignness (e.g. 
“Why don’t you go back where you came from?”) could be expected 
to be less prominent, at least in the case of white converts, I expected 
that there could be an element of “racism by proxy,” as described by 
Franks.41 She found that some of her white Muslim respondents 
experienced racial abuse; she explains this with reference to the fact 
that these Muslims are “linked by association” with Pakistani or 
South Asian Muslims.42 She suggests that converts are of particular 
interest in this context: “As white Muslims in Britain, located at the 
intersection of religious and ‘racial’ boundaries, their experience of 
wearing the hijāb in a liberal democracy draws attention to the issues 




In all, thirty in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted 
between August 2005 and July 2006.44 Potential interviewees were 
contacted mainly through snowballing and convenience sampling, 
and some effort was made to ensure a spread which reflected the 
makeup of British converts as a whole (insofar as this is known) in 
terms of gender, age, ethnic background, and Islamic orientation. The 
                                                 
41 Franks, 926. 
42 Ibid., 922. 
43 Ibid., 918. 
44 Seven out of the thirty interviews were conducted by my research assistant, Aisha 
Masterton. 
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interviewees comprised twenty women and ten men (possibly 
corresponding to the male-female ratio among British converts 
generally, though this is not known for sure), between the ages of 19 
and 59, with an average age of 34. The length of time that they had 
been Muslim varied from 4 months to 28 years, with an average of 
10.5 years. With one exception, the interviewees were brought up in 
the UK and (in one case) southern Ireland.45 Twenty-four of them 
were living within the greater London area, while six lived in small 
towns or rural areas in the Midlands and Home Counties.46 Twenty of 
the interviewees were white (including four Irish, two Scottish, one 
Welsh and two mixed European), six were Black African or Afro-
Caribbean, one was mixed-race (Afro-Caribbean and white English), 
and three were Asian. This tallies reasonably well with the probable 
national profile of converts (approximately one-third black, a tenth 
Asian and the rest white).47 The educational level of the sample was 
above average, with just over half being educated to first degree level 
or higher (including one PhD). As far as professional qualifications 
are concerned, the sample included three teachers, a doctor, a 
chartered accountant, a psychologist, an engineer and a social worker, 
although not all of these were currently employed. As regards 
employment status, seventeen people were in salaried employment 
(including five who worked in an Islamic context), two were self-
employed, and three were students; in addition five women were at 
home with young children, and three people were unemployed. 
 
5. The Particular Experience of Converts:  
Family Reaction 
 
                                                 
45 The exception was a woman who was brought up in an English-speaking country 
and who had spent nearly all her adult life in Britain.  
46 Interviewee numbers were too small to be able to discern any significant regional 
differences in experiences of hostility; however, several of the London-based 
interviewees expressed positive appreciation for London’s diversity and 
multicultural ethos.  
47 See Birt.  
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The great majority of converts encounter an initial negative reaction 
when they tell their family about their conversion.48 Family reaction is 
relevant here because the reactions converts encounter from their 
families of origin reflect the attitudes of society at large, but with the 
important difference that parents have a strong motivation to find a 
modus vivendi and retain the ties of affection. Also, a negative reaction 
on the part of a parent may be partly the result of anxiety that their 
son or daughter will encounter discrimination and hostility from 
mainstream society. In particular, many parents are anxious about the 
consequences of their daughter wearing hijāb. The parents of female 
converts also often harbour fears about the general position, status or 
role of women in Islam. One woman’s parents, for example, were 
afraid that when she got married her husband would beat her, 
although when they subsequently got to know the husband their fears 
were allayed.  
Several interviewees felt that negative media images of Muslims 
had adversely affected their parents’ attitudes; in some cases parents 
insisted on bringing up political issues or even engaging in heated 
debates about such matters as the Taliban or countries seen as  
implementing Islamic laws such as Saudi Arabia, and, in particular, 
terrorism. The conversion of a son or daughter was sometimes seen 
as a sort of political betrayal; a male interviewee who had been 
Muslim for fifteen years, and who felt that his relationship with his 
family had deteriorated as a result, told how his family were 
convinced that he was either a terrorist or a supporter of terrorism. 
The “betrayal” could also be seen as cultural, as described by one 
woman: “My mother, who believes European culture is the most 
civilized, cannot get over the fact that I have ‘gone native’ and 
adopted a ‘foreign culture’ that seems more primitive and barbaric. 
She actually finds it distasteful.” The perceived “foreignness” of 
Islam was also a problem for another woman; she says that her 
parents were not at all happy about her conversion “because they saw 
it as becoming an Indian”; her mother had told her: “You need to 
come back down to earth and be Westernized.” As will be seen 
                                                 
48 I have gained the impression that compared to, say, twenty years ago, family 
reaction is, on average, less severe nowadays.  
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below, the themes which come up in relation to family reaction are, 
to a great extent, those which converts and, by implication, other 
Muslims, encounter in relation to society at large.  
 
6. Experiences of Hostility and Discrimination 
 
Human experience and the reporting of it is a highly individual 
matter, and this necessarily complicates any attempts at academic 
research in this area. I noticed during my fieldwork that the broad 
answers people gave when asked whether they had experienced any 
hostility or discrimination because of being Muslim did not always 
correspond to the experiences they reported when questioned in 
more detail about particular incidents. For example, a person might 
report that they had not suffered any hostility or discrimination, and 
then on further questioning reveal that they had been sworn at or 
verbally attacked in the street. This drew my attention to the element 
of subjectivity: different people have different reactions or attitudes 
to the same stimulus. Contrasting attitudes emerged on a range of 
issues, all affecting the way in which discrimination is experienced 
and reported. Compare, for example, the reported experience of one 
young convert writing in to Q-News, reproduced here, with a 
comment made by one of my interviewees, reproduced below: 
 
I began practising Islam after the events of September 11th...I 
grew a beard, put on a topi [Muslim cap] and raised my joggers 
above my ankles. Since the change in lifestyle, I have encountered 
one obstacle after another...I am 17 and have my whole life ahead 
of me but what is the point of studying so hard when no 
employer will hire a bearded man wearing a jubbah [Muslim 
overcoat]? Is it wrong for me to expect to be hired for my 
knowledge and skills, rather than my appearance? I feel like it is 
just going to get worse and the only remedy is to exclude myself 
from everything and just keep myself engaged in the 
remembrance of my Creator.49 
 
                                                 
49 Q-News, no. 352, December 2003. 
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By contrast, a male interviewee talking generally on the problems 
encountered by Muslims in Britain volunteered the following: “I’ll be 
frank and say if you wanna have a long beard and shalwar kameez and 
turn up for a job interview like that you might not be doing yourself 
too many favours - you might need to just wear a suit for the 
interview at least.” The pragmatic realism of the latter, a convert of 
almost twenty years, contrasts with the idealistic fervor of the former, 
much younger convert who had only been Muslim for two years.  
Interviewees reported a range of varying types of experience 
ranging from verbal abuse to more subtle forms of discrimination 
such as difficulty in getting jobs or in being promoted at work. Most 
people felt that things had become worse since 9/11, and that they 
had deteriorated at least temporarily in the immediate aftermath of 
7/7; however, sometimes they were describing a general impression 
they had gained, rather than direct personal experiences of hostility. 
Not surprisingly, men reported far fewer problems than women, 
whose religious identity tends to be much more visible. In fact a 
relatively small minority of male converts dress in a way that is 
identifiably Muslim;50 while many have beards, the beard is usually 
not unambiguously Islamic. Of the ten men in my sample, nine wore 
a beard, but only three of these regarded their beard as distinctively 
or recognizably Islamic. Only one man habitually dressed in 
“Islamic” style, wearing a robe, but because his ethnic origin was 
black African, he found that people often took his attire to be 
African rather than Islamic (and his “African” appearance did not 
seem to evoke hostile reactions).51  
Due to this low profile, most of the men were unsure as to 
whether they had encountered prejudice, or whether any negative 
experience could be attributed to their religious affiliation. The black 
African male convert mentioned above, whose appearance was 
perhaps more “African” than “Islamic,” felt that he had definitely 
suffered discrimination which was racially motivated, but was not 
                                                 
50 Maha al-Qwidi’s Phd thesis found that all twenty men in her sample dressed in 
European style: see pg. 210; similarly, in Ali Köse’s study of conversion to Islam in 
Britain, only three out of fifty men radically changed their dress: see pg. 131. 
51 In addition, three of the men wore Islamic dress on an occasional basis, for 
example at the mosque or Islamic events, or when in a Muslim country. 
Studies in Contemporay Islam 
 23 
sure whether religious motivation had also been a factor. In addition 
to the visibility factor, it emerged that men were less likely to be 
verbally abused than women due to the latter being a softer target. 
One rather tall and well-built male convert joked about the fact that 
no one would dare to express overt hostility towards him by virtue of 
him being “a large, black guy.” His wife, who was present during the 
interview, said that she sometimes received verbal abuse when she 
was on her own, but never when she was with her husband. For 
whatever reason, the types of experiences reported by the men were 
largely to do with getting job interviews or jobs (in the case of those 
who used their Muslim names in that situation), or being promoted at 
work. One man who felt he’d been “left out of the loop” at work 
commented that he never went to the pub when invited, adding: “I 
may have inadvertently excluded myself.” As Modood points out, 
cultural racism can affect groups which do not accept mainstream 
norms, including, as in this case, those who abstain from drinking 
alcohol in a social context, as well as those who choose to dress in 
distinctive ways.52 
The women’s experience differed markedly from that of the 
men. For example, almost half of them reported definite incidents of 
verbal abuse. None of the women had actually been physically 
assaulted (though some knew of women who had been). Probably 
the most traumatic-sounding experience reported was someone who 
had been attacked by a woman in the street, seemingly out of the blue 
and without provocation: “She was going with her fists as though she 
was gonna punch me in the face…and then she made the sound of a 
bomb.” At the time this convert had been pregnant and accompanied 
by her toddler, so felt particularly vulnerable and unable to challenge 
the attacker as she normally would have done. She said that she had 
been reluctant to go out with her children for some time following 
that incident. 
Women also described more subtle forms of prejudice. Several 
had noticed whispering, funny looks, or felt they were stared at when 
                                                 
52 Modood, Multicultural Politics, 41-42. 
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they took on the hijāb.53 One woman said that she often had people 
look her up and down from head to toe; sometimes she would smile 
at them, at which point they would usually look away or get 
embarrassed. She compared this to the experience of people with 
visible disabilities: “People forget that you’re not just an object.” The 
women who did not wear hijāb, of whom there were three, tended to 
experience the same kinds of discrimination as the men, i.e. work-
related. One of these described a similar form of social exclusion to 
the man quoted above who had refrained from going to the pub with 
his workmates. She had previously worked in the City, and said that 
she had experienced “bullying” in the form of pressure to go to the 
pub and drink at lunchtime. She had found that there was “a very 
heavy pub culture, and if you don’t comply you do get the sense that 
you’re not being considered one of the gang…You lose chances.” 
Another woman who did not wear hijāb spoke of “sarcastic 
comments” at work, but ironically perhaps felt that people would not 
dare to make them if she did wear the hijāb (possibly an implicit 
reference to new legislation against religious discrimination in the 
workplace).54 
 
7. Thematic Analysis 
 
Gender and Hijāb 
 
This theme provides perhaps the richest set of motifs, arguments and 
images, both in media coverage and the popular imagination, Islamic 
gender norms being represented in much of the discourse as 
challenging or negating some of the most cherished and recently-won 
“Western” values of human rights, female emancipation, and sexual 
liberation. While it is not surprising that press coverage is mainly 
devoted to politics, violence and terrorism, themes related to gender 
                                                 
53 In a broad sense “hijāb”  is used (among other things) to denote the female dress 
code prescribed in classical Islamic law, usually understood as covering everything 
except the face and hands. The word is also often used to mean “headscarf.” 
54 The European Directive on Employment outlawed religious discrimination in 
the workplace from December 2003.  
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are given an airing whenever current events (such as the Jack Straw 
niqāb affair) allow the opportunity.55 Issues such as female 
circumcision, arranged/forced marriages (the two sometimes being 
conflated) and honor killings have periodically become prominent in 
the news, and certain relationships – particularly those involving a 
glamorous/rich/famous white female and a Muslim male – received 
extensive coverage in the 1990s.56 
The original Runnymede Trust report found a recurring theme 
in the media representation of Islam to be “the claim that Islam 
oppresses women, in ways significantly different from and worse 
than the ways in which women are treated in other religions and 
cultures.” Hence the preoccupation with arranged marriages, which 
are generally seen as unhappy, and contrasted with “love marriages” 
prevalent in Western countries. In particular, the occasion of Jemima 
Goldsmith’s engagement and marriage to Imran Khan in the 1990s 
provided an opportunity for some particularly glib generalizations 
about the place of women in Islam, including one commentator 
(writing in the Guardian) who predicts that she will be “expected to 
live in women’s quarters,” and that her new life will be “diametrically 
opposite to that of a Western woman.” Another laments that the new 
bride “must always have one niggling thought on her mind: how 
many other wives will Imran Khan take?”57  
The “veil” (a term which can incorporate both niqāb and hijāb, 
and is often ambiguous) provides a rich and endlessly versatile 
symbol, perhaps the most powerful symbol of Muslims’ Otherness 
and alien values. Often portrayed in the media as “restrictive and 
burdensome,” it is closely related to the theme of women’s 
subjugation, and is seen as something imposed rather than chosen.58 
In the wake of the Jack Straw affair, the word “niqāb”’ was added to 
the existing repertoire of “burqa,” “veil,” and “hijāb,” enabling 
columnists to make finer distinctions between the different types of 
                                                 
55 In late 2006, heated public debate followed comments by Jack Straw (then 
Leader of the House of Commons), and Tony Blair, which strongly implied that 
the niqāb (face veil) represented an obstacle to the integration of British Muslims. 
56 Poole, Reporting Islam, 255. 
57 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge to Us All, 28-29. 
58 Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam, 91.  
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covering. Excerpts reproduced in The Search for Common Ground show 
the variety of themes which come into play. Joan Smith of The 
Independent, in an emotive piece in which she declares that she 
“loathes” the niqāb and burqa, sees the phenomenon of female 
covering as “a human rights issue”: “I can’t think of a more dramatic 
visual symbol of oppression, the vast majority of women who cover 
their hair, faces and bodies do so because they have no choice.” 
Melanie Phillips sees “the Muslim veil” in even more explicitly 
political terms, pronouncing it “unacceptable” on the grounds that it 
is associated with “the most extreme version of Islam…It’s 
inherently separatist and perceived by some as intimidatory.”59 
Suzanne Moore of The Observer, says of burqas: “These garments are 
shrouds, they stop the wearer from living a full life,” adding: “That 
goes for Lancashire as much as Kabul.” But for her, issues of 
sexuality are uppermost: “If the female body is so sinful it must be 
completely covered, or if its exhibition shows the whorishness of all 
women, we make all sexuality something which is women’s fault. The 
idea that men can’t control sexual impulses while women must does 
nothing to liberate women – or men – from the horrific round of 
repression, guilt, blame and shame.”60 
The hijāb clearly played a significant part in the hostility 
encountered by the female interviewees. When women converts 
adopt the hijāb, there is usually some kind of adverse reaction from 
family, friends and/or work colleagues; in many female testimonies, 
the family is reasonably accepting of their conversion until they take 
on the hijāb, at which point the attitude changes. Because female 
converts are aware of this, the decision to take on the hijāb is often 
preceded by much trepidation and hesitation. In fact the three 
women in my sample who did not wear hijāb (two of whom hoped to 
do so in the future) all feared that to wear it would create a barrier or 
have an isolating effect. One professional woman feared that it would 
adversely affect her relationship with her clients, as her work 
                                                 
59 The Search for Common Ground, 13. 
60 Ibid., 14. Ironically, she hereby reproduces the male-dominated Islamic discourse 
on woman as fitnah (temptation), ignoring the female-dominated discourse on hijāb 
as liberation. 
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involved dealing with families and their emotional problems: “I just 
think would it be a barrier in this current climate, because people 
have perceptions that you’re not going to understand my world 
because you must be in a different world if you’ve got that thing on 
your head.” Several of the women had felt extremely self-conscious 
when they started wearing hijāb, like the one who commented: “I 
found it hard at first, everyone’s staring at you, you become 
completely paranoid.”  
The theme of Muslim women’s supposed oppression came up 
fairly regularly in the interviews in the context of female covering. 
The only woman in my sample who wore niqāb full-time in public 
said that she had received a lot of sympathetic smiles and comments 
such as: “You alright love?,” adding: “They think you’re oppressed.” 
Another said of the hijāb: “A lot of people think you must have been 
forced to wear it because you’re married to an Arab.” A third woman 
said that her friends had asked her why she had gone into “a religion 
that treats women so badly.” 
Women who convert to Islam sometimes find themselves on 
the receiving end of a particular type of hostility, being accused of 
having betrayed the cause of feminism for which women in the West 
fought so hard. Katherine Bullock, a Canadian convert and author of 
an academic study on perceptions of the hijāb, reports that she was 
told that she “didn’t belong” at an International Women’s Day 
gathering, as it was felt that she represented the subjugation of 
women.61 One interviewee described how her mother (who was not 
particularly feminist and in fact held quite traditional values) had told 
her that her (the mother’s) friends felt that she’d “betrayed everything 
they’d fought for” in terms of women’s rights. English convert Huda 
al-Khattab describes how after she adopted the hijāb, a woman at a 
public exhibition “got angry when she realized I was English and had 
willingly embraced Islam. She accused me of being insane (virtually), 
how could I possibly have embraced a religion which did such 
terrible things to women?.”62 
                                                 
61 Bullock, xv. 
62 al-Khattab, 87. 
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While hijābīs sometimes encounter anger from non-Muslim 
women as a result of their alleged betrayal of the feminist cause, they 
may encounter anger from non-Muslim men, and sometimes women 
as well, for an entirely different reason. One woman had had a man 
comment: “Look at the state of that, must be boiling” (a reference to 
wearing full covering during the summer months). Another had had a 
woman in the street remark: “Look at that for a pig’s ear.” These 
comments are likely to be a reaction to the sexual non-availability of 
Muslim women (if not literally, then at least symbolically – they are 
not even playing the game and making a pretence of such 
availability); Franks points out that women as well as men can find it 
hard to forgive those who “disrupt” the “pattern of the masculine 
gaze.”63 Probably not unrelated to this is the fact that several 
interviewees volunteered the view that it was mostly men who 
expressed hostility towards hijābīs in the street. 
The niqāb has a rather different impact from the hijāb on the 
public persona or identity of the Muslim woman. According to 
British convert Na’ima Robert who has written a book about her 
own experience as well as that of other women converting to Islam: 
“It is as if, once you put on the niqāb you cease to have a human 
identity. I know that the niqāb is a shock to the system for most 
people in non-Muslim societies – we are used to seeing so much 
personal information about people around us, being able to tell their 
race, their age, their physique and their attractiveness. The niqab gives 
none of this information.”64 This depersonalization renders the 
covered Muslim woman a blank screen on which others may project 
a plethora of negative images; it also has a “shock” value. Robert 
shows a keen awareness of the possible impact of the fully covered 
woman on observers or passers by: “What does the non-Muslim see 
when he or she sees us in the street? A relic of a bygone age? A 
lingering symbol of oppression in a liberated world? A religious 
fanatic? A terrorist or terrorist’s aide? An outsider, immigrant, 
interloper?”65 As mentioned above, only one of my female 
                                                 
63 Franks,  920.  
64 Robert, 127. 
65 Ibid. 
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interviewees wore the niqāb at all times when in public; additionally, 
six wore it on an occasional basis. Several female interviewees 
abstained from wearing the niqāb when in Britain, either because they 
would not feel safe, or out of fear that it would create a bad image for 
Islam or be counterproductive from the point of view of da’wah (the 
propagation of Islam).  
The discrimination and hostility experienced by women who 
wear hijāb is offset by the benefits and advantages – perceived or 
experienced – which come from wearing it.66 Some women converts 
commented explicitly on the way in which wearing hijāb had 
strengthened their Islamic identity or heightened their sense of self-
confidence. Some women who report a rise in self-esteem relate it to 
the issue of sexuality, feeling that they no longer have to dress to 
please men (or that they are taking a stand against consumerism, and 
against the commodification and objectification of women’s 
bodies).67 Taking these perceived advantages into consideration 
highlights these womens’ agency and militates against seeing them as 
passive victims of abuse; the discourse of “empowerment” runs 
directly counter to common perceptions of hijāb and niqāb as 




Both Poole and Richardson found that in the mid- to late-1990s, 
conflict and violence were central to reporting on Islam and Muslims, 
with “Muslim” or “Islamic terrorism” being a central theme; Poole’s 
                                                 
66 In the context of Western, non-Muslim societies, the perceived advantages, some 
of which are described in this paragraph and in the following footnote, are 
somewhat different from those which are commonly reported in Muslim countries, 
such as enhanced freedom of movement or improved employment or marriage 
prospects.  
67 A further advantage reported by my interviewees was the strengthened sense of 
belonging to a community, as reported by one woman when she started wearing 
the headscarf: “There was suddenly this network of people, and suddenly there 
were brothers on the tube that would stand up and give me their seat, or would 
look out for me, and I would see that they were making sure that everything was 
okay and it was just completely different. I just felt like, this is making me part of 
something.” 
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follow-up article, coming into the 2000s, found that this theme 
predominated over all others relating to Muslims.68 Muslims in 
general are routinely portrayed as a threat to security, with the motifs 
of “the enemy within” or “fifth column” implicating British Muslims 
in particular. Richardson identifies four main topoi which are used to 
negativize images of Muslims: the military threat posed by Muslim 
countries; the threat of Muslim political violence and extremism; the 
threat to democracy posed by authoritarian Muslim political leaders; 
and the “social threat” of Muslim gender inequality.69 The first three 
are either implicitly or explicitly related to violence. 
While, as discussed below, coverage of British Muslims may in 
some cases be less negative than that of Muslims globally, even prior 
to the phenomenon of “home-grown terrorism” violence was 
sometimes attributed to Muslims in the domestic context. An 
example of this is provided by Richardson, who analyses the 
representation of Muslim opposition to a bingo hall which undergoes 
a name change to “Mecca.” He finds that the Muslim opponents are 
consistently represented as reactionary and/or violent, the reports 
being sprinkled with references to the Muslims’ “demands” (as 
opposed to them asking or requesting), “violent protest,” “attacks,” 
their “anger and irritation,” “ire,” and “outrage.”70 
It is not difficult to find references to violence in the media 
which chime in with age-old anti-Muslim themes. The first 
Runnymede Trust report reproduced a particularly crude example 
from an article by Robert Kilroy-Silk published in the Daily Express in 
1995. After referring to the public cutting off of ears and hands in 
Iraq, the article continues: “Moslems [sic] everywhere behave with 
equal savagery. They behead criminals, stone to death female – only 
female – adulterers, throw acid in the faces of women who refuse to 
wear the chadar [sic], mutilate the genitals of young girls and ritually 
abuse animals.”71 His infamous article entitled “We Owe Arabs 
Nothing” published several years later in the Sunday Express did not 
                                                 
68 Poole, “The Effects of September 11,” 102. 
69 Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam, 75. 
70 Ibid., 120. 
71 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: A Challenge to Us All, 26. 
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refer explicitly to “Moslems,” but the reference to “suicide bombers, 
limb-amputators, women repressors” was clearly intended to invoke 
Islam, and not just the Arabs of the title.72 Evening Standard columnist 
Brian Sewell argues that “Islam has always been militant; the urge to 
conquer and convert began with the great imperial thrust of 
Mohammed himself.” Asking rhetorically what “Islam” will gain 
from a clash with the West, he replies: “It will secure the old 
certainties of poverty, disease, the suffocating conformism compelled 
by the beatings, amputations and hideous executions of sharia law – 
‘the will of Allah,’ as they say when children die, and ‘God is great,’ 
they shout when men and women, hanged for what we see as mere 
misdemeanour, choke slowly in the noose.”73 The war historian John 
Keegan, as Defence Editor of The Daily Telegraph, explains that the 
religion of Islam “inspired the raiding Arabs to become conquerors 
of terrifying power,” before drawing a direct parallel between 9/11 
and “the Oriental tradition”: “Arabs, appearing suddenly out of 
empty space like their desert raider ancestors, assaulted the heartlands 
of Western power, in a terrifying surprise raid.”74 Thus we find a 
potent mix of old and new themes combined in mutually reinforcing 
ways: the initial Islamic conquests, harsh Islamic punishments, and 
“Islamic terrorism.” 
Given the timing of my interviews, which began the month 
after the July bombings, it is perhaps not surprising that interviewees 
felt that the theme of terrorism was somehow present, even if it 
wasn’t verbally expressed; several commented that their families 
expected them to explain or defend so-called Islamic terrorism or 
political extremism. One woman said that since 7/7, “People look at 
you like you are a terrorist, as soon as they see your head covering 
they think you’re going to blow them up.” Another sensed “a kind of 
wariness…Is she a terrorist?...There is a kind of barrier which people 
are scared of Islam.” Another commented on an experience of being 
stared at by both customers and staff in a bank: “I was so scared…I 
                                                 
72 The article was accessed at http://www.bintjbeil.com/E/news/040104_kilroy 
silk.html on 06/06/2009. 
73 See Sewell. 
74 See Keegan. Both Sewell and Keegan were quoted in the second Runnymede 
Trust report, but I have chosen slightly different quotes from the original articles. 
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actually felt that they were feeling I was a terrorist or something.” 
Such experiences were more common immediately following the July 
2005 London tube bombings, but most said that the sense of hostility 
had subsided somewhat fairly soon afterwards. One woman said that 
she had felt uncomfortable at work after the bombings when her 
colleagues were discussing the event. When a non-Muslim colleague 
had mentioned that she was scared to go on the tube, this convert 
had said that she too was scared: “They looked at me in surprise, to 
see that I felt the same way that they did.” One female English 
convert who was known to me because she assisted me in my 
research on British converts was accosted in the street by a man 
shouting “Muslims are murderers!.”75 
At times, the theme of violence is linked to the hijāb. As Farhia 
Thomas of the Muslim Women’s Resource Centre in Glasgow points 
out, describing reactions that she and her hijāb-wearing friends 
encounter: “We’re either oppressed or we’ve got Kalashnikovs under 
our coats.”76 Interestingly, a male interviewee who was himself very 
discreet about his Muslim identity, preferring a culturally minimalist 
and theologically-oriented version of Islam, echoed the view 
expressed by Melanie Phillips above: “niqāb is the uniform of an al-
Qaeda sympathizer…When I see women in niqāb, I just think they’re 
the sympathizers of the terrorists of today and the breeders and 
nurturers of the terrorists of tomorrow. You don’t wear that unless 





Quantitative and qualitative studies of the British press show that 
although at times British Muslims are seen in a slightly more 
favorable light and in less stereotypical ways, the lines between 
British Muslims and Muslims globally are blurred, with direct links 
                                                 
75 The scene of this happening was actually shown on Newsnight, 08/03/2005. Aisha 
Masterton had been walking along the road talking to the Newsnight interviewer 
with the cameras rolling when the incident happened. 
76http://www.nujglasgow.org.uk/understandingislam.html  (accessed 11/11/2006).  
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frequently being made between them.77 While global Islam outweighs 
British Islam in terms of quantity of coverage, there is a good deal of 
osmosis between the two, for example when British Muslims are seen 
as “the enemy within,” or as a conduit for the penetration of 
“foreign” values into Britain.78 Islam and Muslims are thus still seen 
as a foreign phenomenon. The permeability of the boundaries 
between domestic and foreign Islam/Muslims contributes to the 
sense of the Muslim presence in, and immigration to, the UK as 
threatening. Indeed, both Richardson and Poole found that British 
Muslims, like other Muslims, are strongly Otherized, to the extent 
that they are excluded from Britishness, either because of values or 
characteristics they are perceived as lacking, or because of those that 
they are perceived as having (namely “Islamicness”).79 
Both the Honeyford and Rushdie affairs in the 1980s had a 
strong foreign dimension (pertaining to pupils’ extended visits to 
Pakistan and Khomeini’s so-called fatwa respectively), and with the 
rising specter of “Islamic fundamentalism” and then “Islamic 
terrorism” in the 1990s, specific connections were made between 
events abroad and the infiltration of Islamists into Britain (bringing 
right-wing criticism of Britain’s relatively liberal immigration and 
asylum policies). The link between foreignness and violence is made 
even more explicit in stock images of cartoonists who, in recent 
years, have depicted an enemy who resembles bin Laden – complete 
with beard, turban, robes, Kalashnikov and hooked nose.80 Bin Laden 
is of course just one of a number of obligingly foreign-seeming and 
bellicose “folk devils,” including Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri 
Mohammed.  
As indicated or hinted at above, a major motif in Muslims’ 
perceived foreignness is their allegedly alien culture and values. A 
certain emphasis on education in press coverage of Muslims, 
                                                 
77 E.g. Poole, Reporting Islam, 98. 
78 Poole. “The Effects of September 11,” 96. 
79 See Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam, 152, and Poole, Reporting Islam, 249 and 
259. 
80 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action, 17. The report 
explains that this enemy is depicted not just as evil and threatening, but also as 
“stupid, naïve, unsophisticated, unscientific, primitive, a figure of fun.” 
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especially in the 1990s, arose from the recognition of the key role 
which education plays in transmitting cultural values and social 
norms to the younger generation.81 This strand of discourse resonates 
with Huntington’s famous “Clash of Civilizations” thesis. In much 
anti-Muslim rhetoric, exclusion of Muslims goes beyond the national 
context; as Miles and Brown observe, “the difference which is 
imputed to Muslims is not just cultural but civilizational.”82 Poole 
reports that Islamic cultural practices are seen as “restrictive and 
abhorrent to a modern liberal society,” while Richardson observes 
the centrality and dominance of the idea that Muslims are “barbarians 
in need of (Our) civilisation.”83 Cultural difference is predominantly 
seen as “cultural deviance,” and increasingly as a cultural threat.84 
Thus Samuel Brittain of the Financial Times is able to contend that 
“Islamist militancy is a self-confessed threat to the values, not merely 
of the United States, but of the European Enlightenment: to the 
preference to life over death, to peace, rationality, science and the 
humane treatment of our fellow men, not to mention fellow women. 
It is a reassertion of blind, cruel faith over reason.”85 As seen above, 
attitudes to gender are framed as a particularly prominent part of 
Muslims’ alternative cultural values.  
As with the theme of violence, the theme of foreignness is 
often linked with the hijāb. Franks observes that the wearing of the 
headscarf can be seen as “very unBritish”; one white Muslim woman 
wearing a headscarf, being asked by a friendly older woman on a train 
where she was from, “felt almost obliged to claim to be foreign.” As 
Franks points out, white Muslims (the most visible of whom are 
hijāb-wearing women) are sometimes seen as “race-traitors” by white 
supremacists.86 As mentioned above, for my interviewees family 
reaction was sometimes exacerbated by the sense that the son or, 
more likely, daughter was adopting a “foreign” culture. Some of the 
                                                 
81 Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam, 137. 
82 Miles and Brown, Racism, 164. 
83 Poole, “The Effects of September 11,” 99; Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam, 
230. 
84 Richardson, (Mis)Representing Islam, 232. 
85 Cited in Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action, 11. 
86 Franks, 923-924. 
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comments received by the female interviewees indicated that they 
were being perceived as foreigners; one white English woman was 
told to “go back to [her] tent” and referred to as a “bloody Arab,” 
while a mixed-race woman was told to “go back to [her] own 
country.” An Afro-Caribbean woman said that other Afro-Caribbean 
people did not see her as “one of them,” but “just as a refugee or 
someone who’s just come over, she’s ‘other.’” 
The assumption of foreignness was not always accompanied by 
hostility. A rather less pernicious experience of women wearing hijāb 
was that of being spoken to slowly as if they didn’t speak or 
understand English very well (and subsequently of encountering a 
shocked reaction when they answered in an 
English/Welsh/Irish/Scottish accent). One female interviewee said 
on the subject of adopting the hijāb: “You became an ethnic 
minority…not that many comments but odd looks and also people 
treating you like you’re stupid,” adding: “I kind of miss those days 
because now you get treated like you’re evil.” Generally speaking, the 
kindly indulgence and efforts at sympathy which South Asian 
Muslims with their “foreign ways” may sometimes encounter (as in 
Jacobson’s description of a white woman expressing concern for a 
fasting Pakistani girl: “Are you feeling alright? You must be careful, 




The following description, in the Runnymede Trust 2004 follow-up 
report, of some common symbols in cartoon imagery illustrates the 
complex ways in which different Orientalist or Islamophobic motifs 
are interrelated, often intertwined, and mutually reinforcing: “magical 
flying carpets, with their implications of exotic and alluring 
irrationality; genies kept in bottles and lamps, evoking dark, 
destructive, uncontrollable forces; scimitar-shaped swords, 
symbolising primitive cruelty; and minarets, implying foreign and 
outlandish beliefs and practices.”88 
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What emerged from the “grassroots” interview material (as 
opposed to newspaper coverage which places more emphasis on 
politics and, correspondingly, violence) was the predominance of 
issues related to gender. For non-Muslims in contemporary Britain, 
and no doubt elsewhere, it seems to be issues related to gender and 
sexuality rather than religious concerns in the narrower sense that 
epitomize Islam’s Otherness; no doubt this is because Islamic 
teachings on male-female relations are highly distinctive when set 
against the norms of contemporary mainstream Western society. The 
hijāb provides a visual stimulus and seems to act as a lightening rod 
for feelings of hostility, to the extent that it even becomes associated 
in some cases with violence and terrorism, as indicated above. 
Because it draws together so many anti-Muslim themes and motifs, 
the hijāb seems to have the capacity to serve as a focal point for 
Western antipathy to Islam; in fact, the hijāb or veil acts as a metonym 
not just for gender relations in Islam but for Islam in general. Beattie 
gives an idea of its symbolic potency and semantic flexibility: “The 
veiled woman is part of the Otherness which the so-called western 
man of reason projects onto his eastern counterparts, by depicting 
the Arabic-Islamic world as feminized and irrational. This oriental 
figure…represents seduction and threat, mystery and challenge, so 
that it is very difficult to see her humanity clearly through the west’s 
own cultural veils.”89 Different readings of the “veil” illustrate 
opposing agendas and worldviews; while to the wearer (and to 
Muslims in general) it often symbolizes piety, and sometimes 
empowerment, in anti-Muslim discourse it symbolizes women’s 
oppression, first and foremost.  
The various issues which are commonly thrown up by the 
discourse around the veil in contemporary Britain – the subjugation 
of women, the insertion of religion into the public sphere together 
with the removal of sexuality from that same public sphere (in both 
cases going against the grain of mainstream society) - all relate to a 
broader theme, that of the alleged dichotomy between the veil and 
modernity. Blatant religiosity itself is seen as offensive, the more so 
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when the religion in question espouses values which are seen as 
belonging to a bygone age (as seen in the accusations of betrayal of 
the feminist cause). This is particularly highlighted in the case of 
converts, who cannot simply be dismissed as having an “exotic” or 
foreign culture.  
One reason for the hostility encountered by women wearing 
hijāb is that it subverts a longstanding tradition in Western culture 
which assigns to women the role of being looked at, of being 
evaluated and enjoyed visually, by men in particular but also by other 
women. Franks refers to the long history of female nudity in Western 
art which has contributed to this, and points out that although British 
society is liberal in many ways, it still has certain expectations of 
women, in particular that they be “the object of the gaze.” The 
refusal of Muslim women who cover to conform to this expectation 
constitutes a disruption of power relations.90 While at certain times 
and places the “veil” has been constructed as exotic and sensual, in 
contemporary, highly sexualized Western societies, it may be resented 
for its perceived repression of sexuality. The “puritanical” aspect of 
the hijāb/veil is reflected in Werbner’s suggestion that in 
psychoanalytic terms, the fear of Islam could be framed as “the fear 
of the super-ego gone wild,” with its claim to moral superiority.91 
Despite the varying constructions put on the “veil,” one element of 
continuity, both historically and in the present, is the Western 
ambivalence towards Muslim or “Oriental” women, as seen in 
Rabbani’s description of nineteenth-century European feelings of 
“desire, pity, contempt and outrage,” with Oriental women being 
seen “as erotic victims and as scheming witches.”92  
The hijāb draws reactions varying from sympathy to outright 
hostility, partly according to the perceived degree of agency of the 
wearer. Ironically, it is sometimes the case that the more freely the 
hijāb is perceived to have been chosen, the greater the hostility. 
Despite the fact that freedom of choice and individual agency are 
highly-prized values in Western societies, the woman who freely 
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chooses Islam and/or the hijāb may incur anger; on the other hand, 
when women are perceived as wearing the hijāb out of compulsion 
rather than free will, this leads to a construction of Islam as 
“oppressive”—so either way, hostility may be directed at Muslims as 
a result. As with the issue of freedom of speech, this issue brings out 
the “liberal paradox”—the difficulty liberals have in tolerating 
something which they perceive as illiberal or intolerant. 
Repeated references to the violence, barbarity and cruelty of the 
Other clearly fulfils the function of distancing these undesirable traits 
from the Self, which can then be seen as decent, peace-loving, just, 
humane, and promoting human rights. The treatment of the theme of 
violence is quite closely linked to contemporary global political 
events; while the Iraq war did not have the same kind of impact as 
9/11 or 7/7, it nevertheless raised questions about Muslims’ loyalty 
(notwithstanding widespread opposition to the war among non-
Muslim British people). Werbner suggests that the Muslim as 
“religious fanatic” or as “violent terrorist” is “the folk devil par 
excellence of a post-modern age.”93  
Despite the continual coverage of “Islamic terrorism” and 
related themes in the press, in Muslims’ actual everyday experience 
these issues came to the fore in the wake of particular events, 
especially 9/11 and 7/7, and for the women especially, were 
ultimately superseded by issues related to gender.  
The theme of foreignness fulfils the overriding function of 
Otherization, polarizing categories of humanity into “Us” and 
“Them.” As Poole observes, “to exoticise and render the internal 
Other inherently different, if not foreign, allows the Other to be 
managed, and promotes a sense of national identity at the Other’s 
expense.”94 She concludes that such representations are used to 
justify social and aggressive policies to manage Muslims worldwide.95 
While the hijāb is sometimes associated with literal foreignness, but 
mostly with “foreign” or alien values, the same can be said of 
                                                 
93 Werbner,  8. Werbner explains this with reference to the fact that this particular 
folk devil negates the impulses of “consumption and individual self-gratification,” 
which are celebrated in Western societies today. 
94 Poole, Reporting Islam, 251. 
95 Poole, “The Effects of September 11,” 101. 
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customs which are perceived as culturally alien, such as abstention 
from alcohol and non-mixing of the sexes. Given that Islamophobia 
can be seen as a form of cultural racism, it is perhaps ironic that while 
in previous decades media images were of Arabs (especially in the 
1970s) or Iranian Mullahs and Ayatollahs (especially in the 1980s), the 
“Islamic terrorist” of the past decade or two in some ways transcends 
ethnicity. Having said that, even the faceless and raceless “Islamic 
terrorist” is no doubt conceived of as foreign and Other in a general 
sense, as seen in the racialized cartoons of terrorists resembling Bin 
Laden referred to above. 
Robinson’s study of representations of Islam in early modern 
English literature draws parallels between the seventeenth century 
and the present day, particularly in terms of the function of anti-
Muslim discourse. Describing the seventeenth century as a moment 
of crisis and transformation in terms of both Europe’s self-
understanding and its understanding of the differences between itself 
and Islam, he relates that the discourse of “fanaticism” was projected 
onto Islam in order for Christendom to distance itself from its own 
recent past of religious wars and violence; from this emerged the 
discursive contrast between reason and fanaticism (then called 
“enthusiasm”), between political modernity and premodern 
irrationality. The role of Islam was to aid Europe in its negation of its 
own premodernity, to become the name for all that Europe had 
rejected in its own self-image. He concludes that today, “images of 
Islamic fanaticism are again being circulated in order to provide cover 
for the most radical transformations of state power, citizenship, and 
the rule of law.”96 
This article has not addressed the institutional aspects of 
Islamophobia, as that has been done elsewhere by those who are 
more qualified to do so.97 The suffering caused by anti-Muslim 
hostility to individuals such as the woman referred to above, who 
feared going out with her children after being accosted in the street, 
necessitates an urgent institutional response. Alongside that, it is my 
                                                 
96 Robinson, 178-179.   
97 See for example the two Runnymede Trust reports and The Search for Common 
Ground. 
Zebiri: Orientalist Themes in Contemporary Islamophobia 
 
 40 
belief that there is a place for exploration of the deeper, underlying 
psychological causes of contemporary anti-Muslimism, and the 
resulting understandings can contribute, no matter how subtly or 
imperceptibly, to a change of consciousness. Such an exploration 
could benefit from the insights provided by psychoanalytical theory 
and developmental and humanistic psychology. Gilman’s work on 
stereotypes provides an example of such an approach. He sees the 
creation of stereotypes as linked to an early developmental stage 
when the child’s sense of self splits into a “good” and a “bad” self, a 
division which the child subsequently projects onto the outer world. 
He concludes that “we need crude representations of difference to 
localize our anxiety, to prove to ourselves that what we fear does not 
lie within.”98 
In conclusion, there seems little doubt that a significant factor 
in understanding Islamophobia is the seemingly unusual capacity of 
Muslims/Islam to resist—in terms of culture, moral values, and 
religiosity—Western universalistic aspirations; Islam appears to 
challenge prevailing intellectual trends of relativism and pluralism. 
The rapid changes brought about by globalization, including 
increasing pluralization and shifts in the international political order, 
contribute to a feeling of insecurity. For Britain in particular, the end 
of empire, the nation’s gradual diminution as a world power, its 
involvement in Europe, migration and regional devolution have all 
added to the sense of uncertainty.99 At such times, the creation of 
“folk devils” onto which one can project one’s own shadow side 
(unwanted or unacknowledged traits) is especially appealing. The 
representation of Muslims as barbaric, cruel, irrational, backward, 
repressive of women, irredeemably alien and Other, goes hand in 
hand with a view of the Self – whether it be the West, Europe, or 
Britain – which is modern, progressive, rational, civilized, humane 
and liberal. The shadow side may also include the past Self. Referring 
to Western civilization’s prolonged struggle to overturn the 
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domination of the Church, Werbner observes that in facing Islam, 
Europe in some sense faces its own past: “Islam evokes the spectre 
of puritanical Christianity, a moral crusade, an attack on permissive 
society.”100 Reactions to the hijāb bring this out particularly clearly: the 
subjugation of women, the covering of womens’ bodies and the 
restrictions on sexuality, or maybe just old-fashioned “family values” 
whereby the wife takes care of home and husband, all conjure up a 
past which for some people is still a living memory. The “threat” of 
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